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Penthouse are imagining themselves having intercourse, and notreally having intercourse at all.
Despite the many passages I have quoted from Feminism Unmodified, I fear I may not have adequately recreated the aura of
dementia radiating from this book. I have long suspected that feminism has gotten as far as it has because people simply do not read
the ipsissimae dixeunt of feminists themselves. So I will close by
leaving the reader with the quintessence of the MacKinnon
sensibility:
To be about to be raped is to be gender female in the process of going about life as
usual.
[T]he fight over a definition of obscenity is a fight among men over the best means
to guarantee male power as a system.

And now my favorite (no easy decision). As the reader ponders it,
he might reflect that the book from which it is drawn was lauded in
the New York Times, and that feminism, unmodified, continues to
be embraced by a wide segment of the legal, academic, and intellectual community:
Playboy's articles push their views, including their views of the First Amendment,

in an expressly sexualized context, and at the same time those articles serve to legitimize what their pictures do to women. Masturbating over the positions taken by
the women's bodies associates male orgasm with the positions expressed in the articles. Ever wonder why men are so passionate about the First Amendment? ... I
must also say that the First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through years
of absolutist writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particular. You know
those superheated articles where freedom of speech is extolled and its imminent
repression is invoked. Behaviorally, Playboy's consumers are reading about the
First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, masturbating to the women.

CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL,
SECOND EDITION. By David E. Engdahl. 1 St. Paul, Mn.:
West Publishing Co. 1987. Pp. xlv, 411. Paper, $10.95.
Daniel 0. Conkle 2
On the back cover of this and other books in its "Nutshell"
series, West Publishing Company advertises its product as "a succinct exposition of the law to which a student or lawyer can turn for
reliable guidance." West might have added that law professors,
I.

2.

Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound.
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
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most of whom read Nutshells only surreptitiously, tend to dismiss
these books as far too "succinct" to be truly "reliable" and far too
"expository" to be worthy of critical attention. I therefore was
more than a little surprised when the editors of Constitutional Commentary suggested that I not only read this Nutshell, but also review it.
Whatever the merit of other books in this series, however, Professor David Engdahl's book is not a typical Nutshell. At over 400
pages, it is not especially "succinct." More important, its presentation is not especially "expository," at least not in the usual sense.
Professor Engdahl discusses a wide range of matters affecting constitutional federalism, including Congress's legislative powers, preemption, and intergovernmental relations. His overriding purpose,
however, is to "challenge[ ] the seemingly prevalent impression that
legal issues of federalism have little substance (and less importance)
today." And he finds "the most recent utterances" of the Supreme
Court to be "neither indispensable, nor necessarily useful, in the
effort to master this branch of Constitutional Law." As a result, the
"reliability" of Engdahl's work depends as much on the strength of
his arguments as it does on his descriptions of prevailing judicial
doctrines.
Engdahl addresses a broad range of problems, and he offers
interesting insights on a variety of constitutional issues.3 The most
intriguing part of the book, however, is its central argument that
there are-or at least should be-judicially enforceable constitutional limitations on the exercise of congressional power. This argument is too elaborate and complex to describe in detail, but I can
sketch a few of its fundamental components.
Unlike the judicial advocates of "states' rights" in the National
League of Cities-Garcia line of cases, Engdahl does not rely on the
tenth amendment, which he concedes to be a truism. 4 Instead, he
attempts to rehabilitate what Chief Justice Rehnquist recently
called "one of the greatest 'fictions' of our federal system," the doctrine of enumerated congressional powers.5 Engdahl argues that
3. In a lengthy treatment of dormant commerce clause issues, for example, Engdahl is
highly critical of the Supreme Court's doctrine, and he asks "whether this entire unhappy
enterprise is one which the judiciary properly should engage in at all."
4. Engdahl appears to support the position of the majority in National League of Cities
and the dissenters in Garcia, but not on the basis of the tenth amendment. Instead, he suggests that at least when Congress adopts regulations that require reliance on the necessary
and proper clause, state immunity might be appropriate when an application of those regulations to the states would not be "proper" in light of the states' role in our constitutional
system. See also Engdahl, Sense and Nonsense About State Immunity, 2 CONST. COMM. 93
(1985).
5. Rehnquist was an Associate Justice at the time he made this comment. Hodel v.
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the Constitution's listing of congressional "powers" in fact enumerates permissible "objects" or "subject matters" of regulation.
Within these areas, Engdahl agrees that Congress can regulate in
the pursuit of whatever ends it desires, including "police power"
objectives. For example, Congress can regulate matters actually
"in" interstate commerce, such as the interstate shipment of handguns, even if Congress's only purpose is to further some aspect of
the public health, safety, or morals. On the other hand, Engdahl
makes a unique argument that congressional legislation of this type,
although constitutionally valid, should not preempt state law that
conflicts only with Congress's "police power" objectives, and likewise, to the same extent, should not give rise to federal immunity
from state regulation or taxation. Under this reasoning, the activities of federal agencies and corporations often could be regulated or
taxed by the states.6 Moreover, Engdahl defines some of Congress's
enumerated powers, such as its power to tax and its power over
federally-owned property, much more narrowly than does the modem Supreme Court. 1
As to matters falling outside of these enumerated areas, Engdahl contends that Congress must rely on the necessary and proper
clause. Following Marshall's reasoning in McCulloch, Engdahl argues that Congress can reach these "extraneous" matters only if the
congressional regulation is a proper "means to effectuate federal
policy with respect to some legitimate federal concern," such as interstate commerce. Although he accepts the prevailing view that
courts must defer to rational congressional judgments on what he
calls the "telic" relationship between means and ends, Engdahl contends that this "rational basis" review is not meaningless, and that
it sometimes might lead to judicial invalidation.
More important, Engdahl would increase the potential for invalidation by imposing two requirements, not generally recognized
in current doctrine, on congressional regulation pursuant to the
necessary and proper clause. First, he would impose a "particularity requirement": each particular aspect of congressional regulation
would have to be supported by the requisite "telic relationship."
Under this view, Congress could not exercise general control over
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. See also Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLO. L. REv. 51
(1973).
7. Engdahl in fact maintains that article IV's property clause(§ 3, cl. 2) should not be
read to confer an enumerated legislative power at all, but only the power of a proprietor. See
generally Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283
(1976).
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an "extraneous" subject matter, such as mining, merely because
that subject matter substantially affected a "legitimate federal concern," such as interstate commerce. Instead, each particular congressional control of a local activity like mining would be "valid
only if that particular control effect[ed] Congress' goal for interstate
commerce." Engdahl thus criticizes the Supreme Court's companion decisions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Association and Hodel v. Indiana, in which the Justices upheld the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 without engaging in a "telic relationship" inquiry for each of the numerous
regulations in the Act.
Second, Engdahl would impose a closely related requirement
of "actual" congressional purpose, which would permit the courts
to uphold congressional regulation under the necessary and proper
clause only if there were "some sufficient indication that Congress
did have a legitimate objective, perceived the telic connection, and
acted upon that ground." For example, Congress constitutionally
could prohibit the local sale of dangerously flammable illuminating
oil in order to make interstate shipping safer for other products, but
not to protect consumers. On the other hand, so long as Congress
had a permissible purpose in this sense, the presence of other, "police power" objectives-even if those other objectives were the predominant reasons for the legislation-would not make the law
invalid. Engdahl even concedes, moreover, that the necessary and
proper clause permits what some would regard as a "bootstrap."
Thus, Congress would be permitted to regulate an "extraneous"
matter as a means to effectuate a regulation falling within the area
of enumerated congressional concerns, even if the latter regulation
itself were designed to further "police power" objectives. For instance, Congress could prohibit the "manufacture or local sale of
... handguns ... as a means to effectuate [a congressional] prohibition of their interstate shipment," even if the prohibition on interstate shipment were "itself targeted at reducing local handgun
crimes (an extraneous end)." Relying on this theory, Engdahl supports the Supreme Court's arguably "bootstrap" reasoning in
United States v. Darby.
In both his general framework and his application of that
framework to particular constitutional issues, Engdahl presents an
analysis that is intellectually sophisticated. He constructs an intricate model with a number of interrelated components, and he applies this model to a variety of different constitutional problems.
But one leaves the book doubting whether Engdahl's suggested approach is one that ought to be embraced.
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Although Engdahl advocates a renewed emphasis on judicially
enforceable limitations on congressional action, he defends most of
the Supreme Court's modern decisions upholding the exercise of
congressional power. To be sure, his reasoning often differs substantially from the Court's. But this may only suggest that he
paints an analytical picture far more complex than is necessary to
explain or justify the Court's decisionmaking.
To the extent that Engdahl's approach would make a difference, moreover, his reasoning is far from compelling. In light of his
other concessions, Engdahl's related requirements of "particularity" and "actual purpose" under the necessary and proper clause
would not appear to impose any meaningful substantive limits on
the types of legislative policies that Congress could pursue. Instead,
they would impose nothing more than procedural and evidentiary
burdens, which Congress could meet by carefully structuring its legislative action to comply with Engdahl's model. Even if Congress
could not satisfy Engdahl's necessary and proper clause requirements in furtherance of a given enumerated power, some other enumerated power, either alone or in conjunction with the necessary
and proper clause, usually would be available to accomplish the
same substantive result. Engdahl nonetheless defends the burdens
that he would impose on the theory that "[a]n important function of
constitutional doctrine is to make the political process do its work.
It erects conceptual hurdles- deliberately artificial obstacles- to
impede precipitous majoritarian action by multiplying (and isolating from transient issues) the points on which majority agreement
must be reached." Beyond a general suggestion that liberty is enhanced when Congress finds it difficult to operate, however, Engdahl offers no justification for imposing "deliberately artificial
obstacles" on the adoption of legislation that Congress determines
to be in the national interest.
Some of Engdahl's arguments do call for limitations on the exercise of national law-making power that might not easily be overcome through calculated legislative maneuvering. His novel
position concerning the limits of preemption and federal immunity,
for example, would have significant doctrinal implications, as would
his narrow definitions of Congress's power to tax and its power to
control federally-owned property. Through the use of different legislative strategies, Congress could circumvent some of the barriers
that these doctrinal changes would erect, but others might be difficult to overcome. In any event, Engdahl makes no meaningful effort to explain why we should accept the restrictive approaches that
he advocates.
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Engdahl has written an intellectually stimulating book that
contains a number of interesting and useful ideas. At the same
time, despite its own suggestions to the contrary, the book also fulfills the role of a more conventional Nutshell by providing helpful
explanations of the evolution and modem status of various constitutional doctrines.
Engdahl's goal for his book, however, is more ambitious, for he
attempts not only to describe, but also to defend, a scheme of judicially enforced limitations on congressional power. Yet in the context of federalism, no less than elsewhere, we need to know why the
judiciary should be restricting the operation of the legislative process. If the appeal is to the wisdom of the framers, we need to know
whether their judgments are still wise in the 1980s, and, if not, why
their intentions should nonetheless continue to control. If the appeal is not so much to the framers as to functional considerations
guiding the proper operation of our modem democracy, this functional analysis must be set forth and defended. Engdahl makes no
serious effort on either fronts As a result, his attempt to shore up
the law of constitutional federalism is incomplete, and therefore unsuccessful, because such an effort cannot succeed without a more
persuasive theoretical foundation.

STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By David M. O'Brien.1 New York, N.Y.:
W. W. Norton & Company. 1986. Pp. 384. Cloth, $18.95;
Paper, $9.95.
Jeffrey Brandon Morris2

Professor David M. O'Brien has brought forth a readable but
serious book about the Supreme Court, appropriate for adoption in
undergraduate upper division courses, or as collateral reading in
law school courses in constitutional law, or simply as an introduction to the Court for intelligent laymen. From the perspective of a
8. Indeed, his argument that the judiciary should enforce significant limitations on the
power of Congress seems at least somewhat at odds with his critique of the Supreme Court's
dormant commerce clause doctrine. In the course of that critique, he contends that "when
debatable choices must be made among competing public interests, or between public and
competing private interests, one might well wonder whether they ought not be made through
the political rather than the judicial process," and he adds that "interests locally disadvantaged do have political representation in Congress."
I. Associate Professor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of
Virginia.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

